

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NATO 07394

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, PFOR, NATO, UN
SUBJECT: JULY 29 NATO CONSULTATIONS ON SSOD: UK STUDY
OF SRI LANKA PAPER.

REF: USUN 1069 (NOTAL)

1. UK DELEGATION ON JANUARY 27 CIRCULATED THE FOLLOWING STUDY OF THE SRI LANKAN PAPER ON SSOD (REFTEL). UK POLADS REP (JANVRIN) REFERRED TO STUDY DURING JULY 29 POLADS MEETING ON SSOD (SEPTTEL). HE SAID PAPER HAD BEEN PREPARED AS INTERNAL FCO STUDY, AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DISTRIBUTED DURING RECENT MEETING OF EC DISARMAMENT EXPERTS.
2. DURING POLADS DISCUSSION OF PAPER, BELGIAN, CANADIAN, GERMAN AND ITALIAN EXPERTS SAID THEY SHARED UK VIEWS EXPRESSED IN STUDY. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES AGREED WITH POINTS OF CRITICISM IN UK STUDY, BUT THOUGHT THE TONE TOO CONFRONTATIONAL.
3. TEXT OF UK STUDY OF SRI LANKA PAPER BEGINS:

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UK COMMENTARY ON NON-ALIGNED PAPER A/AC.187/55 OF
18 MAY 1977

I. INTRODUCTION

PARAS 1/2. AGREED. THE NON-ALIGNED HAVE A SPECIAL
INTEREST IN DISARMAMENT BECAUSE THE THIRD WORLD SHARE

OF GLOBAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE HAS BEEN RISING RAPIDLY
(50% OF THE WORLD TOTAL IN 1956, 60% IN 1966, 150% IN
1976).

PARA 3. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THE DISARMAMENT
NEGOTIATIONS ARE AT A STANDSTILL. AS PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE
PAPER POINTS OUT, DISARMAMENT "IS AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX
QUESTION" WHICH IN THE WORDS OF PARAGRAPH 10 AFFECTS
"THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF
MEMBER STATES". AS THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE SAID
IN THE TEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE IN JULY 1962:
"WE ARE IN FACT DOING SOMETHING VERY AMBITIOUS - WE
ARE TRYING TO REVERSE MAN'S HABITS THAT HAVE BEEN DEVEL-
OPED OVER THOUSANDS OF YEARS, AND GENERAL AND COMPLETE
DISARMAMENT CAN ONLY COME ABOUT IF WE ACHIEVE WHAT,
IN EFFECT, AMOUNTS TO A CHANGE IN MAN'S NATURE".
CONSEQUENTLY RAPID RESULTS CANNOT BE HOPED FOR.
NEVERTHELESS, THE UK RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY PERIODICALLY
TO RENEW THE SENSE OF URGENCY WITH WHICH THE NATIONS
ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL.
SECONDLY, WHILE WE AGREE THAT GLOBAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE
IS SPIRALLING, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE HAS BEEN
A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY
EXPENDITURE OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS. MOST OF THE INCREASE
IS DUE TO HIGHER SPENDING BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
AND THE THIRD WORLD.
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PARA 4. WE AGREE WITH THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED IN THIS
PARAGRAPH, ESPECIALLY WITH THE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED
FOR ALL STATES TO PARTICIPATE AND ON THE COMPLEXITY
OF THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT. GIVEN A SPIRIT OF
UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION, THE SPECIAL SESSION
COULD BE A LANDMARK IN THE PROGRESS TOWARDS GCD. ON THE
LAST SENTENCE, WE TAKE THE VIEW THAT THERE IS NOT ONE
ARMS RACE (WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT IT IS BETWEEN
NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT) BUT A NUMBER OF REGIONAL ARMS
RACES TAKING PLACE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE
EVIDENCE IS THE FACT THAT IN 1975 THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES SPENT 6.1% OF THEIR GNP ON DEFENSE AND THE
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 5.9% OF THEIRS.

PARA 5. WHILE WE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE UTILITY OF
DEVOTING MUCH TIME TO DRAWING UP A LIST OF PRINCIPLES
OF DISARMAMENT, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS INEVITABLE THAT
THE SPECIAL SESSION WILL DO SO AND WE BELIEVE THE
WESTERN STATES SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR OWN PRINCIPLES
IN ORDER TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE.
ON THE ORGANIZATION OF DISARMAMENT MACHINERY AND THE

CENTRAL ROLE OF THE UN, SEE PARAGRAPHS 25 - 32 BELOW.

PARA 6. WE ENTIRELY SUPPORT THESE AIMS. THE LAST ONE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ONLY A UNIVERSAL REDUCTION IN MILITARY EXPENDITURE WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO LOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AN INDUSTRIALIZED NATION SPENDS ON DEFENSE AND THE SUM IT PROVIDES IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, AND WE REJECT AN ARBITRARY PERCENTAGE LINK BETWEEN TWO QUITE SEPARATE AREAS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY.

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PARA 7. ON THE ARMS RACE SEE THE COMMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE. THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE SLOW PROGRESS OF THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS IS THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION; STATES CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO REDUCE OR GIVE UP THEIR OWN FORCES WITHOUT ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE DOING THE SAME. AS THE UK TOLD THE TEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE IN JULY 1962: "WE ARE READY TO PAY THAT PRICE. WE WILL OPEN OUR COUNTRY TO ANY INSPECTION THAT IS NECESSARY TO GIVE CONFIDENCE, BUT THINK THAT THIS IS TRUE OF EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES". CONSEQUENTLY PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT HAS DEPENDED ON TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENTS IN NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION SUCH AS SATELLITES.

PARA 8. WE AGREE THAT CAREFUL AND ADEQUATE PLANNING OF THE SESSION IS ESSENTIAL. WE ALSO BELIEVE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLABORATION WITH ALL COUNTRIES; STATES WILL BE UNWILLING TO BE REPRESENTED "AT AS HIGH A LEVEL AS POSSIBLE" IF THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE SESSION
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SHOW THAT IT WILL BE USED FOR POLEMICAL ATTACKS ON ANY STATE OR GROUP OF STATES.

II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

PARA 9. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THIS ANALYSIS OF THE PAUCITY OF RESULTS ACHIEVED. AS THE UK STATED ON 28 APRIL 1976 (IN THE CONTEXT OF ROUND): "WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE VALUE OF WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED. THE YEARS SINCE THE UNITED NATIONS CAME INTO EXISTENCE HAVE NOT BEEN UNPRODUCTIVE. THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF HAS PRODUCED TREATIES ON OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC. THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD) HAS NEGOTIATED SEVERAL AGREEMENTS, NOTABLY THE NON-PROLIFERATION AND SEA-BED TREATIES AND THE BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS CONVENTION. LATIN AMERICAN STATES HAVE ESTABLISHED A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE BY THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO...." THOSE WHO PLAY DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE ACHIEVEMENTS SHOULD ASK THEMSELVES IN WHAT PERIOD OF HISTORY HAS SO MUCH BEEN ACHIEVED. IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD THERE WERE A SERIES OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS BUT THEY ONLY AFFECTED A SMALL NUMBER OF POWERS; THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 WAS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL TREATY. IN THE TWO DECADES BEFORE 1914 THE FIRST TWO HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES TOOK PLACE BUT THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS WERE STRICTLY LIMITED.

PARA 10. WE AGREE THAT ANY DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY THE SPECIAL SESSION WILL HAVE TO BE DRAFTED IN GENERAL TERMS AND THAT IT IS VITAL "NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE POLITICAL REALITIES".
THE RIGHT OF ALL COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE IN CIVIL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE II OF THE
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IAEA STATUTE WHICH STATES: "THE AGENCY SHALL SEEK TO ACCELERATE AND ENLARGE THE CONTRIBUTION OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO PEACE, HEALTH AND PROSPERITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD..". IT IS ENDORSED BY ARTICLE IV OF THE NPT

WHICH STATES: "NOTHING IN THIS TREATY SHALL BE INTERPRETED AS AFFECTING THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY TO DEVELOP RESEARCH, PRODUCTION AND USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES". THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO MENTION SPECIFICALLY THAT "DUE CONSIDERATION (SHOULD BE TAKEN) FOR THE NEEDS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS OF THE WORLD".

PARA 11. ITEM (I). THE UK IS COMMITTED TO GCD UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL BUT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A UNILATERAL COMMITMENT TO END NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS "PENDING A CTB", NOR COULD WE AGREE TO AN UNEQUIVOCAL RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNTIL THE PROGRESS TOWARDS GCD IS FAR ADVANCED AND EXISTING DISPARITIES IN THE LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED.

ITEM (II). ZONES OF PEACE INVOLVING LARGE MARITIME AREAS MAY PRESENT OBSTACLES TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS.

ITEM (III). THE UK HAS SUPPORTED THE LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE BY RATIFYING ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS I AND II OF THE TREATY OF TLAHELCO. WE AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT NWFZS SHOULD BE TAILORED TO FIT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE REGION CONCERNED. WE HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THAT WE WILL TAKE A SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS ANY NWFZS WHICH CONFORM TO THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:

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- (A) THE DECISION TO FORM SUCH A ZONE SHOULD BE
- TAKEN FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY BY THE STATES
- IN THE REGION.

- (B) THE ZONE SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY
- OF ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS.

- (C) ALL MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STATES AND PRE-
- FERABLY ALL STATES WITHIN THE REGION SHOULD
- BE INCLUDED.

- (D) THERE SHOULD BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPARTIAL
- INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION ADEQUATE FOR
- THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE REGION.

ITEM (IV). INsofar as the arms race consumes an increasing proportion of the resources of the developing countries, it can be said to retard their economic development, but this appears to have no relevance to the establishment of a "new international

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ECONOMIC ORDER.

ITEM (V). THIS IS STANDARD SOVIET AND NON-ALIGNED RHETORIC ON COLONIALISM. WE COULD ACCEPT IT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT "ALIEN DOMINATION" REFERS TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION. BUT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE PARAGRAPH WERE OMITTED FROM ANY STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES WHICH MAY EMERGE.

ITEM (VI). WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A PROGRAMME OF AGREED MEASURES IS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR A PROCESS OF GENUINE DISARMAMENT.

ITEM (VII). WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BY UN DEFINITION, ARE ATOMIC, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IS ALREADY PROHIBITED UNDER THE 1972 CONVENTION. PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS THE SUBJECT OF A UK DRAFT CONVENTION TABLED IN THE CCD IN AUGUST 1976. TALKS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE IN PROGRESS BETWEEN THE US AND USSR. MEASURES TO DEAL WITH NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE CCD. WHILE AGREEMENT ON THESE ISSUES WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON SLOWING DOWN THE ARMS RACE, IT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE OF OTHER PRIORITY TASKS SUCH AS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN.

ITEM (VIII). WE DO NOT ACCEPT THIS PRINCIPLE. ON THE CONTRARY WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ALLIANCES ARE A VITAL ELEMENT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS. EXPERIENCE BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR SHOWED HOW VULNERABLE SMALL STATES COULD BE TO AGGRESSION UNLESS THEY WERE PROTECTED BY A CONFIDENTIAL

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STRONG DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT STATES CALLING ON THEIR ALLIES FOR ASSISTANCE IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY.

ITEM (IX). THIS PRINCIPLE IS ENSHRINED IN THE UN CHARTER. THE REAL PROBLEM IS TO STRENGTHEN THE STABILITY OF ALL STATES SO THAT OTHER STATES WILL NOT HAVE A PRETEXT FOR INTERFERING IN THEIR AFFAIRS. AN EXAMINATION OF WORLD HISTORY SHOWS WHICH STATE HAS BEEN THE WORST OFFENDER SINCE 1945.

PARA 12. WE AGREE THAT A DECLARATION OF NEW PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD DRAW UPON EXISTING PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSALS, AS SET OUT IN A/AC.187/30.

PARA 13. PRINCIPLE (I). WE ACCEPT THESE SENTIMENTS, WHICH ARE COMPATIBLE WITH A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
PRINCIPLE (II). THE UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE AND THE CCD DO IN FACT DEVOTE MUCH OF THEIR TIME TO NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT SHOULD GO HAND IN HAND TO AVOID GIVING ANY ADVANTAGE TO THOSE STATES WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY STRONG IN ONE OR OTHER FORM OF ARMAMENT.

PRINCIPLE (III). WE CANNOT ACCEPT THIS PRINCIPLE. ARTICLE 26 OF THE UN CHARTER LAYS DOWN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DRAWING UP "A SYSTEM FOR THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS". BUT THE CHARTER DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE UN SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ALL

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DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS; ON THE CONTRARY, ARTICLE 52 LAYS DOWN THAT NOTHING IN THE CHARTER SHOULD "PRECLUDE THE EXISTENCE OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OR AGENCIES" FOR DEALING WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

PRINCIPLE (IV). WE ACCEPT THE DESIRABILITY OF PARTICIPATION BY ALL NWS IN NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, BUT THIS IS A QUESTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

PRINCIPLE (V). WE DO NOT ACCEPT THIS REJECTION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. WHILE IN THE LONG TERM WE LOOK TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GCD TO ENSURE OUR SECURITY AND ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS TO THAT END, IN THE SHORT TERM THE MEMBERS OF NATO RELY ON THE DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO DETER AN ATTACK BY THE WARSAW PACT. AS THE UK STATEMENT ON DEFENCE ESTIMATES IN 1976 (PARAS 28 AND 31) SAID: "TO BE ABLE TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO ANY WARSAW PACT ATTACK, NATO MUST DEPLOY CONVENTIONAL, THEATRE NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC FORCES...
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STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES CONSTITUTE THE ULTIMATE DETERRENT; WITHOUT THEM NATO'S FORCES WOULD NOT PRESENT A CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO THE WARSAW PACT WITH ITS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENAL. THEY THUS HELP TO DETER ATTACKS AT ANY LEVEL AND WOULD ALSO DETER ATTEMPTS TO ESCALATE A CONFLICT SHOULD ONE BEGIN".

PRINCIPLE (VI). THE IAEA STATUTE PROVIDES FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY WITHOUT DIS-

CRIMINATION; SO DOES ARTICLE IV.1 OF THE NPT. THE POLICIES OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP ARE DESIGNED TO TAKE SAFEGUARDS OUT OF THE AREA OF COMMERCIAL COMPETITION, AND NOT TO HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES.

PRINCIPLE (VII). WE AGREE THAT DISARMAMENT EFFORTS SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED; BUT THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDS MORE ON POLITICAL WILL THAN ON THE ACTUAL DISARMAMENT MACHINERY.

PRINCIPLE (VIII). WE AGREE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON PARTIAL MEASURES SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE GCD, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AN ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY ON GCD WOULD BE FRUITFUL AT THIS STAGE BECAUSE OF THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE. AN EXTENSIVE EFFORT WAS MADE TO NEGOTIATE JUST SUCH A TREATY IN THE 1950S WITH THE RESULT THAT NOT A SINGLE ARMS CONTROL TREATY WAS NEGOTIATED. AS THE UK SAID IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNGA IN NOVEMBER 1969: "GCD MUST BE THE ULTIMATE AIM OF EVERY CIVILIZED NATION IN THE WORLD. IT IS THE VISION WHICH WE MUST NEVER ALLOW TO FADE. WHATEVER ELSE WE ACHIEVE CAN ONLY BE A BEGINNING. BUT IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE PERVERSE TO ADOPT AN ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH".
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PRINCIPLE (IX). WE AGREE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF BALANCED DISARMAMENT. WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT "ALL MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE BALANCING SO THAT AT NO STAGE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY TREATY COULD ANY STATE OR GROUP OF STATES GAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND THAT SECURITY IS ENSURED EQUALLY FOR ALL. THE GOAL OF LIMITED MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT IS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT A LOWER LEVEL OF DEFENCE". THE IRONY OF THE LAST SENTENCE IS THAT THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ARE ALREADY MAKING STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO CLOSE THE GAP THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THEM AND THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STATES.

PRINCIPLE (X). WE BELIEVE THAT GCD WOULD INVOLVE THE REDUCTION (NOT ELIMINATION) OF WEAPONS AND ARMED FORCES TO LEVELS WHICH WOULD RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AGGRESSIVE WAR.

PRINCIPLE (XI). WE AGREE THAT VERIFICATION METHODS ARE INDISPENSABLE.

PRINCIPLE (XII). THIS IS A STANDARD FORM OF WORDS ON THE LINK BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT WHICH

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS LONG ACCEPTED.
PRINCIPLE (XIII). AS THE UK STATED IN ITS REPLY TO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON ROUND: "THE UNITED KINGDOM
GOVERNMENT DO NOT THEMSELVES FIND THAT THE EXISTING
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON DISARMAMENT ARE INADEQUATE
BUT RECOGNISE THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS MAY". CONSE-
QUENTLY THE UK SUPPORTED THE MEASURES CURRENTLY BEING
PUT IN TRAIN TO INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION ON
DISARMAMENT CURRENTLY BEING PUT OUT BY THE UN. WE

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HAVE ALSO MADE EFFORTS TO WIDEN THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

PARA 14. IT IS UNFORTUNATE IF SOME COUNTRIES CANNOT
FEEL ANY INTEREST IN THE ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATION; BUT
WE TAKE HEART FROM THE FACT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE
ACHIEVED IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCORDED
WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT
ANY PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT WOULD PRODUCE
ISSUES OF GREATER IMPORTANCE TO THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

PARA 15. WE AGREE PROVIDED THAT THE PROGRAMME IS
FLEXIBLE. TECHNICAL AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS MAKE IT
BOTH POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE ORDER IN
WHICH SUBJECTS ARE CONSIDERED.

PARA 16. WE AGREE. THE UK HAS FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED
THE VIEW THAT A WDC IF PROPERLY PREPARED AND ATTENDED
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BY ALL THE NWS COULD FURTHER THE PROGRESS OF DISARMAMENT.

PARA 17. WE AGREE WITH THE FIRST SENTENCE BUT WE
SHOULD PREFER NOT TO SEE AN ORDER OF PRIORITIES OF
THIS SORT DRAWN UP; IT WOULD BE MORE PRACTICAL FOR THE
AGENDA TO INCLUDE ALL THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS WHOSE
SOLUTION IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. MOREOVER WE
SEE NO NEED IN THIS PARAGRAPH OR IN PARAGRAPH 18 FOR A
REFERENCE TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS,5)#8:# 2343 :9;343\$
THE THE 1972 BW CONVENTION. NOR DO WE THINK THAT A
REFERENCE TO NEW MDW (NONE OF WHICH HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED)
SHOULD BE INCLUDED WHILE OTHER ITEMS OF PARAMOUNT
INTEREST (SUCH AS THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS
AND THE LIMITATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS) ARE
OMITTED.

PARA 18. WE AGREE WITH THE CESSATION OF ALL NUCLEAR
WEAPON TESTS. HOWEVER, A BAN ON RESEARCH AND DEVEL-
OPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A CESSATION OF
PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR MILITARY
PURPOSES AND A FREEZE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WOULD BE UNVERIFIABLE. NWFZS CANNOT BE RESPECTED
UNTIL THEY ARE ESTABLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.
WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
WE COULD CONSIDER A PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF INCENDIARY
WEAPONS WHICH CAUSED UNNECESSARY SUFFERING AND WOULD
NOT BE REPLACED BY EQUALLY DAMAGING WEAPONS. FURTHER
TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF NEW MDW IS NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY
TYPES OF WEAPON AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN ARMS
CONTROL TREATY IS PRACTICABLE. AS REGARDS FOREIGN
MILITARY BASES, EACH COUNTRY HAS A RIGHT TO CALL ON
ITS ALLIES FOR ASSISTANCE IN ITS DEFENCE AGAINST
EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. NOT ONE OF THE PROPOSED MEASURES
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IN THIS PARAGRAPH WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE CON-
VENTIONAL ARMS RACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

PARA 19. A REDUCTION IN US/SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS
BEING DISCUSSED IN SALT. BW ARE ALREADY THE SUBJECT OF
A COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITION. THE UK DRAFT CONVENTION

ON CW INCLUDES PROVISION OF DESTRUCTION. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO VERIFY THE ELIMINATION OF STOCK-PILES OF INCENDIARY WEAPONS; A MORE PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE IS TO ESTABLISH LIMITATIONS ON THEIR USE. POSSIBLE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (APART FROM BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL) HAVE NOT YET BEEN SATISFACTORILY IDENTIFIED. THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND MILITARY BASES IS NOT POSSIBLE UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCES, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCENTRATING ON EXPANDING ITS MILITARY POWER IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE WORLD. THE GRADUAL REDUCTION OF OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS AND ARMED FORCES IS A POSSIBLE SUBJECT FOR REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, ON THE PATTERN OF THE MBFR TALKS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT WOULD ALSO BE FACILITATED BY AGREEMENTS ON THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS AND THE LIMITATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS.

PARA 20. WE AGREE THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES HELP TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE ANY SUPPORT TO THOSE WHO WANT A WORLD TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE, SINCE THE PRINCIPLES ARE ALREADY FIRMLY ESTABLISHED IN THE UN CHARTER

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INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDA-07 ERDA-05 AF-10 ARA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
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R 011609Z AUG 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5185
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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PARA 21. THE UK HAS FREQUENTLY MADE CLEAR THAT IT IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY MEASURES WHICH COULD FURTHER

THE PROGRESS OF DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. IN PARTICULAR WE SHOULD LIKE TO SEE UNIVERSAL APPLICATION OF THE METHODS RECOMMENDED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EXPERTS GROUP ON THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS. IN THE SHORT TERM, FOR THE REASONS GIVEN ON PRINCIPLE V ABOVE, WE COULD NOT AGREE TO AN UNEQUIVOCAL RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SECURITY ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NPT OR OF A REGIONAL NWFZ. WE ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE, WHICH IS ENSHRINED IN THE UN CHARTER. WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN STATES. WE SUPPORT THE IDEA OF NWFZ (SEE PRINCIPLE III) BUT HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT ZONES OF PEACE (SEE PRINCIPLE II).

PARA 22. WE AGREE. AS THE UK STATED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1959: "PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN INSTITUTIONS
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FOR MAINTAINING PEACE AND THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS".

PARA 23. THE UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE DOES EXAMINE THE PROGRESS OF THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS EACH YEAR, ON THE BASIS OF THE CCD REPORT. THIS PROCESS, AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE, WOULD PRESUMABLY CONTINUE IF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION WERE AGREED.

IV. MACHINERY FOR DISARMAMENT

PARA 24. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THERE IS STAGNATION IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT. INDEED, THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN 1977 ON SOME PRIORITY ISSUES APPEAR BRIGHTER THAN FOR SOME YEARS. AS REGARDS MACHINERY, THE UK STATED IN APRIL 1976 IN ITS REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON ROUND: "THE DISARMAMENT MACHINERY AT PRESENT USED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PROVIDES ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSING NEW IDEAS OR FOR PURSUING NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR NEGOTIATION, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CREATION OF NEW BODIES TO DEAL WITH DISARMAMENT WOULD NECESSARILY FACILITATE PROGRESS".

PARA 25. THE UK REPLY ON ROUND CONTINUED: "THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROVIDES SUFFICIENT SCOPE FOR ALL UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE FULL RANGE OF DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS". WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE UNGA IS TO

DEBATE DISARMAMENT ISSUES, AND THAT A SEPARATE NEGOTIATING BODY IS REQUIRED.

PAR 26. THE UK REPLY ON ROUND STATED: "THE UNITED
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KINDGOM GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE CCD REMAINS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING BODY. IT IS AT PRESENT CONDUCTING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ITS PROCEDURES". WE TAKE THE VIEW THAT IT IS NOT THE DISARMAMENT MACHINGERY WHICH HAS LIMITED PROGRESS BUT THE INTRACTABLE NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE.

PARA 27. IT MUST BE SAID THAT IF THE CCD DID NOT EXIST IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INVENT IT OR SOMETHING VERY LIKE IT. IT HAS SHOWN ITSELF CAPABLE OF BEING MODIFIED TO ACCORD WITH THE NEEDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. WE WOULD CERTAINLY FAVOR THE INCLUSION OF CHINA IN THE CCD. THE QUESTION OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES IS ONE FOR CCD MEMBERS OT PURSUE. WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ALLCONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS ON THEIR MERITS.

PARA 28. THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ALREADY HAS A REPRESENTATIVE AT THE CCD. THE CCD REPORTS TO THE UNGA AND HAS SPECIFIC TASKS REMITTED TO IT. IT IS DEFFICULT TO SEE WHAT IMPROVEMENTS WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY HAVING AND ORGANIC LINK.

PARA 29. THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION HAS BEEN INACTIVE FOR SO LONG THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER ITS FUTURE ROLE.

PARA 30. IT WOULD ALSO BE OPPORTUNE TO CONSIDER THE ROLE OF THE UN CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT.

PARA 31. WE CONTINUE TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE UTILITY OF A WDC.

V. AGENDA AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK.

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PARA 32. THE VERSION OF THE AGENDA AGREED ON 18 MAY IN THE UNSSD PREPARATORY COMMITTEE REPRESENTS AN

IMPROVEMENT ON ITEM (A), WHILE GIVING UNDUE EMPHASIS
TO A WDC IN ITEM (D).

PARA 33. THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION DEPENDS TO SOME
EXTENT ON THE NATURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. SOME FOREIGN
MINISTERS WILL NOT WISH TO ATTEND IF THE SPECIAL SESSION
PROMISES TO BE A PLATFORM FOR POLEMICS AND STERILE
PROPAGANDA.

PARA 34. ORGANISATIONAL MATTERS HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVELY
DISCUSSED IN PC 2.

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Message Attributes

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Disposition Case Number: n/a
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Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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